HISTORIA I ŚWIAT, no 13 (2024)
ISSN 2299-2464
e-ISSN 2956-6436

Yulia KISELYOVA * (Karazin University, Kharkiv, Ukraine)

Viktoriia IVASHCHENKO** (Karazin University, Kharkiv, Ukraine)

# "To live your life not in vain". Ukrainian academics' experience of forced migration in Poland

https://doi.org/10.34739/his.2024.13.29

**Abstract:** *The authors consider the forced migration of Ukrainian academics to Poland caused by the Russian-Ukrainian War, particularly the expansion of communication between the Ukrainian and Polish academic communities and the experience gained in this process. The study is based on the analysis of a body of interviews with Ukrainian academics in forced migration and their Polish colleagues who were directly involved in aiding Ukrainians. The interviews were collected as part of the oral history project "'Moving West': Ukrainian Academics in Conditions of Forced Migration (2014-2023)." The authors focus on several main themes: Ukrainian migrants' decision to leave the country and Polish respondents' decision to get involved in helping Ukrainian refugees (the moment of 'challenge'), making sense of the new reality (the moment of the 'meeting of two cultures'), adaptation to the new conditions, and reflection on the experience gained (the moment of 'construction of specific strategies of behavior').*

**Key words:** Russian-Ukrainian War, Displaced Scholars, Oral History Interviewing, Migration Experience, Academics in Exile, Ukrainian-Polish Relations

## Introduction

A powerful wave of migration across Ukraine's western border has been one of the major effects of the Russian-Ukrainian War. As of 1 August 2023, 6,231,000 Ukrainian refugees were officially registered across the world, with Poland as the country that received the largest number of forced migrants from Ukraine.[1] The shared border between the two countries is only one reason for this; other factors include the very positive recent developments in Poland's economy, the large-scale Ukrainian labor

* Corresponding Author. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2571-8436. yu.a.kiselyova@karazin.ua; The research was made possible by the support of the Max Plank Institute for the History of Science (Dept. I) (10.2022-03.2023).
** ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1799-012X. ivashchenko@karazin.ua; The research was made possible by the support of the Max Plank Institute for the History of Science (Dept. I) (10.2022-03.2023).

[1] UNHCR, Ukraine Refugee Situation, 2023.

migration to the country in previous years, which increased significantly after 2014 (before the invasion in 2022, approximately 1,3 million Ukrainians were residents in Poland[2]), the presence of migrant communities in many Polish cities,[3] the cultural proximity between the two nations, and the unprecedented level of support for forced migrants in the first months of the war. As of July 2022, 77 per cent of adult Polish citizens had at some point taken part in helping Ukrainian refugees; only 20 per cent limited their involvement to the initial stage of the Russian invasion, while the rest continued volunteering as the war went on.[4]

Part of this large-scale movement of people was the migration of Ukrainian academics, the scale of which we can now judge only approximately, since there is no single database of Ukrainian academic migrants. According to *The Results of the Survey on the Needs of Ukrainian Scientists*, out of 2,173 respondents at the time of the survey (April-May 2022), 47.2 per cent remained in their place of permanent residence, 38.1 per cent had become internally displaced persons, and 14 .7 per cent were living abroad.[5] It is hard to say how representative this sample is in relation to the group in general. However, it certainly hints at the overall trends and new challenges posed before Ukrainian academia by the Russian invasion.

The emergence of a new category of Ukrainian academics in forced emigration has already attracted scholarly attention. Traditionally, researchers of Ukrainian intellectual migration had preferred to work with statistical materials, focusing on the directions of migration flows and registering the threats they present and the advantages they produce. The frequently named threats are 'brain drain' (as of 2013, 30 per cent of Ukrainian academics were contributing to the economies of foreign countries), deepening demographic problems, decreasing quality of the labor market in Ukraine, and signs of degradation of the country's intellectual potential in general, while the advantages include the 'circulation of minds,' attraction of foreign investments, and Ukraine's integration into the global research and educational community.[6]

The latest analytical studies based on surveys of academics in forced migration, however, embrace a wider range of problems: the socio-demographic status of Ukrainian academics abroad, the challenges academic migrants are facing, their preferences and plans for the future, and their thoughts about the prospects of Ukrainian science and education.[7] There are also studies applying the qualitative approach to the analysis of the experience of displaced academics in the context of European institutional support for Ukrainian scholars.[8] These studies aim to outline the new configuration of

[2] Maryam *et al*., 2023.
[3] Duszczyk & Kaczmarczyk, 2022: 165.
[4] Baszczak *et al*., 2022: 5.
[5] Lutsenko *et al*., 2023: 5.
[6] Baranik & Romanenko, 2014; Alekseeva & Gorbanova, 2016; Demidenko, 2018.
[7] Maryl *et al*., 2022.
[8] Sikorska & Nykyforenko, 2022.

the Ukrainian academic community and hypothesize the role of today's academic migrants in the future post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, plans for which are being actively developed and discussed.[9]

In addition, recent studies have registered fundamental changes in the geography of migration. For a long time, post-Soviet countries (including the Russian Federation), the USA, Israel, and other developed countries of the West appealed the most to the Ukrainian intellectual elite, while migration to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was much smaller.[10] After the start of the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2014, the reorientation of the Ukrainian academics towards the West as a whole intensified, and after 2017 it was Polish researchers who replaced Russians as the most frequent collaborators with Ukrainian authors in Ukraine's scientific publication output.[11] The new phase of the Russian-Ukrainian War, which began on 24 February 2022, clearly marked a change in the principal vectors of migration: Ukrainian academics are currently found in 35 countries around the world, but Poland and Germany have accepted the largest number of them.[12]

Our study offers a reflection on the phenomenon of forced migration of Ukrainian academics to Poland, particularly on the ways communication developed between members of the Ukrainian and Polish academic communities and on the experience gained in this process.

## Methodology

The study is based on the corpus of interviews collected as part of the oral history project ‹‹'Moving West': Ukrainian Academics in Conditions of Forced Migration››, which explores strategies of survival and career-building among Ukrainian humanities scholars of the first (2014-2022) and second (2022-2023) waves of migration caused by the Russian-Ukrainian War. To date, a total of 56 interviews have been recorded, including 38 with Ukrainian migrants and 18 with citizens of the host countries. Almost half of the respondents (19) were affiliated with Polish academic institutions. In addition, the study uses interviews with academics that traveled to their destination through Poland or stayed there before receiving financial support from other governments.

At the time of interviewing, the Ukrainian respondents (11) were based in Warsaw, Kraków, Gdańsk, Wrocław, Lublin, Łódź, and Poznań. They represent academic institutions, universities, and museums from all regions of Ukraine, but the majority come

[9] Gorodnichenko, Sologoub & Weder di Mauro, 2022; OECD. Building back a better innovation ecosystem in Ukraine, 2022.
[10] Demidenko, 2018.
[11] OECD. The future of science in Ukraine, Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, 2022.
[12] Compare: Maryl *et al*., 2022; Lutsenko *et al*., 2023.

from the east of the country. Most of the respondents have advanced academic degrees and a work experience of 15 to 25 years; young researchers and the older generation of academics are represented to a lesser extent. The nature of the migration determines the gender makeup of our sample: all of our respondents, with one exception, are women. This composition is generally in keeping with the results of the survey of all categories of migrants in Poland carried out by the UNHCR in 2022.[13]

The Polish respondents (8) are affiliated with universities and academic institutions in Warsaw, Gdansk, Lodz, and Lublin; one is an independent researcher. They also mostly belong to the generation of academics with a work experience of 15 to 20 years, but there is no gender disparity in this case.

The interviews were recorded in the period from April 2022 to July 2023, which allows us to follow the ebb and flow of attention towards particular issues and the evolution of evaluative judgments and the general emotional tone of the interviews. Both audio (in face-to-face meetings) and video (using the ZOOM platform) formats were used for recording, after which the interviews were transcribed in full, with notes on the respondents' behavior, emotional reactions, and tone of presentation, which facilitates further interpretation.

Because of the traumatic effects of interviewing and incompleteness of the events discussed, following certain ethical principles, such as voluntary participation, scientific honesty and veracity, and respect for the rights of the respondents, was an important aspect of our work. Special attention was paid to the safety of the respondents, in particular the protection of their personal data. Most of the respondents gave permission for the widest possible use of their interviews; still, at this stage the names of all participants are kept confidential.

The semi-structured qualitative interview was chosen as the main research method; it presupposes the presence of a questionnaire, but allows the interviewer to vary the list and sequence of questions and, if necessary, give the initiative to the respondent. Considering the narrative of migration experience as a meaningful whole, we nevertheless singled out particular elements that were considered 'key' for our purposes: Ukrainian migrants' decision to leave the country and Polish respondents' decision to get involved in helping Ukrainian refugees (the moment of 'challenge'); making sense of the new reality (the moment of the 'meeting of two cultures'); adaptation to the new conditions; and reflection on the experience gained (the moment of 'construction of specific strategies of behavior'). Further, the narrative approach is combined with the contextual one, which helps to look at the biographical construct as a product of the processes of social interaction.[14]

[13] UNHCR, Ukraine situation, 2022.
[14] Dausien, 1996: 575.

## Invasion and forced migration: academics and their experiences

For all of our respondents, the start of the war was an event the reality of which was difficult to accept: "There was a feeling that you would now go to sleep-wake up, none of this is happening."[15] Even if academics had expected a further deterioration of relations between Russia and Ukraine based on their professional experience[16] or under the influence of their relatives and colleagues,[17] most of them were not prepared for a full-scale invasion. To our Polish respondents, the format of a classic, traditional war, involving occupation of territories, operations in cities, and destruction of urban infrastructure and death of civilians, also had seemed impossible in these modern times, both ethically and pragmatically.[18]

The start of the active phase of the war provoked strong emotions in all respondents. Ukrainian academics who found themselves thrust into the midst of war describe their state with the words 'shock,'[19] 'despair,' 'fear,'[20] 'anger and rage.'[21] This psychological 'unpreparedness' was compounded by acute reaction to artillery shelling in the early days; most of the respondents went through the experience of hiding in bomb shelters. Professional activity during this period either completely ceased or was significantly limited. All of the respondents record attempts to adapt to the new reality: to reorder their everyday life, to find the safest spots inside and outside their home. The disruption of the regular work rhythm led to the development of compensatory mechanisms: respondents observe that they spent most of their time browsing news channels and talking to relatives, friends, and colleagues.

Our Polish interlocutors also report being overwhelmed by the events: "I remember that I had NEVER felt such, such emotions."[22] They most often name fear and a sense of uncertainty. At the same time, one of the first emotional responses was compassion for the Ukrainians and a keen urge to help the Ukrainian colleagues and refugees in general: "…we couldn't stand doing nothing. You had to do something. It was just impossible to not do anything."[23]

All of our Polish respondents were involved in the work of helping Ukrainian refugees from the first day of the war. The forms of this aid varied: raising money and collecting clothes and medicine for refugees and the Ukrainian army, helping with transportation from the border and with finding housing and work, and hosting

[15] PKKD, 18.06.2022. The names of respondents are encoded as follows: form of recording, surname code, place of residence abroad and in Ukraine, date of interview.
[16] PILK, 18.04.2022; ZJW, 23.04.2023.
[17] PKKD, 18.06.2022.
[18] PGW, 24.05.2022; PSG, 11.05.2022.
[19] ZMLM, 31.10.2022; PKKD, 18.06.2022.
[20] PDLR, 17.06.2022.
[21] ZGGM, 30.07.2022.
[22] PGW, 24.05.2022.
[23] PNG, 27.04.2022.

refugees at home: "Some of our friends from, from our historical department started to take people to the, to their HOMES already at 25th."[24] Helping Ukrainian refugees became a powerful catalyst for emotional energy. During the first weeks of the war in Ukraine, many people's involvement was so intense that one respondent describes it as a "participation in a kind of race."[25] Such involvement changed the usual course of life and greatly influenced professional activities.

Note that this was the work of groups and 'networks,'[26] rather than individuals: the family and community levels of the aid effort were very important.[27] Many academics became curators and participants in special formal[28] and informal university centers for helping refugee scholars.[29] A vital component of helping Ukrainian academics was informational support from Polish colleagues concerning academic opportunities to continue work in Poland: "I just sent this information even before it was published on our website, it was published the next day, but on the day of the war I was sending it to different friends, in Ukraine."[30]

Despite the scale of support, the decision to leave the country was a very difficult step for Ukrainian academics, taken under the influence of emotions, including the sense of duty to children or other loved ones: "I was going to leave ONLY with my son… because that was the main reason for leaving"[31]; "if I didn't have a child, I wouldn't have left, I would have been with my husband."[32] Many respondents spoke about the fear of occupation[33] and the impossibility for themselves and their families to live "under Russia."[34] But it was personal invitations from Polish colleagues that became the crucial factor that could tilt the balance in favor of leaving. According to one respondent, the willingness of colleagues to accept not only her, but also her entire family became the "trigger" for the decision to go.[35]

The difficulty of the decision to leave the country was often illustrated by Ukrainian scholars through the theme of packing the luggage. Even though there is no specific question on this in our questionnaire, most respondents stated that they did not have

[24] PSG, 11.05.2022. Hereafter, in order to bring the spoken and written languages as close together as possible, our transcription marks all exclamations and hesitations by the respondent, short (coma) and long (dot and ellipsis) pauses, accent on certain words and phrases (capital letters), quick combination of words (equals sign), stumbles (fragment of a word followed by a hyphen, for instance si- sit), illegible fragments that cannot be deciphered, and abbreviations (ellipsis in square brackets).
[25] PGW, 24.05.2022.
[26] PNG, 27.04.2022.
[27] PSL, 30.07.2023.
[28] ZLR, 05.01.2023.
[29] PLL, 18.06.2022.
[30] PNG, 27.04.2022.
[31] PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[32] ZZPD, 30.06.2023.
[33] ZZPD, 30.06.2023; ZRGK, 20.06.2022.
[34] PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[35] PILK, 18.04.2022.

enough time to pack properly. The theme of emergency packing in the autobiographical narratives of Ukrainian academics became a way to stress the forced nature of the migration and the narrators' inner resistance to fleeing from home. The ensuing journey west was an even more difficult test for our respondents. For all of them it was physically exhausting; for some this was exacerbated by conflicts among Ukrainians and nervous breakdowns suffered by the respondents themselves.[36]

When reflecting on the choice of Poland as their destination, our Ukrainian respondents admitted that for them, as for most refugees, a key factor was Poland's geographical proximity, making it easier to maintain family ties and go back to Ukraine when necessary. This was very important, since the majority of refugees were women with children, while the men and many elderly people remained in Ukraine.[37] Many of our respondents initially planned to leave Ukraine with their loved ones for a short time only: "I went expecting to be gone for two weeks."[38] This was not the main reason, however, since it cannot explain most academics' continued stay in Poland. As of July 2023, only three respondents out of twelve had returned to Ukraine.

For the academic forced migration in general the existence of previous personal ties or professional networks in the country of destination serves as a pull factor.[39] So, the decisive factor for the Ukrainian scholars was academic contacts with Polish colleagues, which, as already indicated, determined the strategies of our respondents. Out of the twelve interviewed academics, seven traveled at the invitation of Polish colleagues, with four of them – to participate in specific academic programs (accordingly, they entered the country a few months after the start of the active phase of the war). Another five respondents traveled without an invitation, but two of them[40] contacted colleagues while on the road and received support, and two more found employment opportunities during the first weeks of their stay in Poland[41]. In the event, eleven of our respondents obtained research fellowships or found work in Polish universities or museums.

Interestingly, specialization in Polish history and culture, or lack thereof, had no direct effect on Ukrainian academics' employment and scholarship prospects in Polish academic and cultural institutions. Only three of our respondents had research interests related to Polish history[42] and, accordingly, were relatively fluent in Polish. This indicates Polish institutions' desire to support Ukrainian scholars while pursuing a policy of 'dual intent' solutions, aimed at fostering the skills of displaced Ukrainian academics and helping them gain valuable experience in international cooperation, but at

[36] PKLK, 16.04.2022; PKKD, 18.06.2022.
[37] Jaroszewicz & Krępa, 2022:165.
[38] PDLR, 17.06.2022.
[39] Vatansever, 2022: 107.
[40] ZRGK, 20.06.2022; PBWK, 05.08.2022.
[41] ZZPD, 30.06.2023; PDLR, 17.06.2022.
[42] ZMLM, 31.10.2022; PKWK, 29.03.2023; ZZPD, 30.06.2023.

the same time allowing them to maintain a connection with Ukraine[43] at the research level and keep their employment in Ukrainian institutions. Our Polish respondents also spoke about the importance of these objectives:

> I thought that the most important is to...to help academics, because academics are...academics or intelligentsia are the core of the nation so if somebody would like to destroy the nation would like to destroy intelligentsia. And it was happening to Polish intelligentsia before, so as we knew that we knew and our University authorities knew. I was not involved in that but they already, at once they knew that they have to open, the chance to academics to come and to continue working and that was the most important.[44]

Indeed, nine of our respondents continued to work remotely in Ukrainian universities or other research and cultural institutions at the time of interviewing. All of them declared plans to return to Ukraine after the end of the war or when the situation stabilized.

### Polish society and aid to Ukrainian citizens fleeing from the war

Despite the fact that for many of our respondents the migration corridor had a clear destination, once the border was crossed Ukrainian academics' emotional state was little different from that of other forced migrants, prominently featuring a sense of loss and fear of the unknown.[45] The future looked as uncertain as it could be, which made it impossible to build a forward strategy: "I had no plans, I DID NOT PLAN"[46] and contributed to emotional instability: "Well, I've been to Warsaw a few times, but right now it's this kind of state… of BEING LOST, like you don't know, where you are, what you are."[47] For one respondent, the experience of frequent academic trips to Poland in the past became a contributing factor to the trauma, underscoring the forced nature of her wartime journey west:

> Some kind of feeling, when you always went, TO POLAND, specifically to Poland, for some opportunities [...] here you're just, a refugee with this little suitcase […] the feeling of yourself, such worthlessness of you, let's say helplessness, right, not worthlessness, helplessness.[48]

[43] OECD. Rights and Support for Ukrainian Refugees in Receiving Countries, 2022: 4.
[44] PNG, 27.04.2022.
[45] Isański & Nowak, 2023: 220.
[46] PKLK, 16.04.2022.
[47] PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[48] ZZPD, 30.06.2023.

It was their encounter with the Polish volunteer movement at the border that gave a positive emotional jolt to many respondents. According to sociological studies, in March 2022 94 per cent of Polish citizens were convinced that Poland should accept refugees.[49] Poland's demonstration of openness to Ukrainian citizens became an important factor influencing the refugee flow to the country.[50] Immediately upon crossing the border (which was facilitated by the Polish government's prompt decision to turn its border crossing points into pedestrian ones[51]), Ukrainian refugees received food, clothes, childcare supplies, medical help, and transport. Ukrainian academics described this aid as a manifestation of "HEIGHTENED goodwill."[52] After a long and exhausting journey westward, this support also had an important psychological effect:

> You see HOT TEA, and you have been for 3 days... like, in the car, on crackers and raisins [...] I felt and understood that... NO, we will not be out on the street... everything will be fine, everything will be fine. Like, we have already gotten out of such hell, but here, well, it's already a different, different world, a different mentali- mentality, that won't let us just... be left out in the street. Somehow such reassurance came then, exactly this first encounter with the volunteers...[53]

Overall, Polish society's unprecedented[54] support for Ukrainian refugees contributed to a high level of psychological capital among the refugees in the first months of the war's active phase.[55] For many interviewees (including those that continued on to other European countries), memories of Polish citizens' help at the border brought tears to their eyes.[56] It is interesting that one respondent expressed doubt as to whether "we would be able to receive Polish people the way they received us".[57] In our view, the intent of this remark is less to criticize Ukraine than to commend the consolidation of Polish society, which is seen in this case as the paragon of a public response to a crisis.

Our questionnaire includes a question about evaluating the performance of various actors of aid, which we put to both Ukrainian and European academics. The former stressed the help of colleagues and friends, but at the same time spoke highly of the work of municipal governments[58] and volunteer organizations, as assistance that

[49] Isański *et al*., 2022: 3.
[50] Grabowska, Jastrzebowska & Kyliushyk, 2023: 422.
[51] Jaroszewicz & Krępa, 2022: 164.
[52] PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[53] ZRGK, 20.06.2022.
[54] Jaroszewicz *et al*., 2022: 7.
[55] Grabowska, Jastrzebowska & Kyliushyk, 2023: 428.
[56] ZKRK, 04.08.2022; ZTLK, 10.06.2023.
[57] ZTLK, 10.06.2023.
[58] PILK, 18.04.2022, PKKD, 18.06.2022.

"COVERS ALL, like, NEEDS."[59] Legalization of stay in Poland and access to medical services and education were also important: "there was such a symbiosis here and GOOD cooperation by everyone, plus ALL these government offices, they worked QUITE in sync, they worked FAST."[60]

At the same time, the Ukrainian academics observed that it was ordinary Polish citizens that became the driving force behind the organization of aid: "Every Polish citizen was a volunteer, and probably is a volunteer today";[61] "we feel that, in Polish society… there is this enormous kind of GRASSROOTS initiative."[62] It is interesting that such opinions were sometimes formed under the influence of representatives of the host country, who considered the government aid to be insufficient, as opposed to the coordinated reaction of Polish society "atomic... public... reaction by the people",[63] which pushed the government to take the necessary measures "if it were not for the Polish public I=I=I am SURE that nothing would have started to work".[64] In particular, it is telling that, despite the increase in the numbers of labor migrants in recent years, there was no dedicated integration policy in Poland.[65] At the same time, the Polish intellectuals spoke highly of the work done by municipalities and universities.[66] This testimony is confirmed by the studies that stress that non-governmental organizations and private individuals were the quickest to react to the refugee crisis, which in turn increased the importance of the social infrastructure of urban metropolitan areas as the locus of a well-developed sector of nongovernmental aid efforts.[67]

Those Polish respondents whose interviews were recorded in the first months of the war spoke harshly about the unpreparedness of state institutions, which tried to shift responsibility to municipal authorities.[68] For many respondents, replying to our question about the performance of various agents of aid became an opportunity to criticize the current government, and one interviewee acknowledged that friction between society and government is a tradition of Polish political life.[69] However, the respondents interviewed later in the war saw the official policy in a more positive light longer-term[70]: "So frankly, I'm a huge opponent of this government, but in the Ukrainian case, I think they did all they could do."[71]

[59] PKLK, 16.04.2022.
[60] PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[61] ZMLM, 31.10.2022.
[62] PKLK, 16.04.2022.
[63] PLL, 18.06.2022.
[64] PGW, 24.05.2022.
[65] Duszczyk & Kaczmarczyk, 2022: 165.
[66] PSG, 11.05.2022; PNG, 27.04.2022.
[67] Isański *et al*., 2022: 4.
[68] PNG, 27.04.2022; PLL, 18.06.2022; PSG, 11.05.2022.
[69] PNG, 27.04.2022.
[70] PSL, 30.07.2023.
[71] ZLR, 05.01.2023.

In the view of the Ukrainian respondents, the motives driving Polish society to help the Ukrainian refugees were sympathy for human suffering,[72] Christian feeling,[73] and quest for 'social capital'[74]: "This aid also gives them some kind of meaning in their lives."[75] Respondents also noted the importance of the existence of a Ukrainian diaspora,[76] the cultural closeness between the two nations, and their shared historical destiny, all of which made it possible to perceive "this calamity as SHARED"[77] and evoked in Polish people respect for the struggle of the Ukrainians for their freedom:

> The motives for aid are that we are the SAME. We are the SAME, we think the same, we similarly… we have the same values. We are... European countries, we value freedom, yes, we are proud, we will not allow ourselves to, like, be oppressed. We are fighting for our dignity, in this we are the same and the Poles UNDERSTAND US VERY WELL IN THIS, they RESPECT these qualities in the Ukrainians.[78]

At the same time, some respondents, citing informal conversations with Polish acquaintances, indicated that the emotion of fear was another factor compelling Polish citizens to help the Ukrainians[79]: "They were afraid the Ukrainians would step aside and the Russian troops would move on Poland";[80] each had a "bug-out bag" (emergency suitcase),[81] while Ukraine was perceived as an "outpost,"[82] a "buffer,"[83] a guarantee of the future prosperity of Poland: "without a free, independent, strong Ukraine, there will be no free, independent, strong Poland."[84] Helping the Ukrainians was seen as both the Polish people's moral obligation and a pragmatic calculation on their part.

It is interesting that most of our Polish interlocutors avoided mentioning "fear" in talking about their own motivation and the motivation of the Polish society as a whole, even though the literature on the subject recognizes that "there is also a sense that the Ukrainian cause is also a Polish cause since Polish security will depend on the resolution of the situation in Ukraine."[85] Discussing their personal motives, Polish academics focused on moral aspects, citing the categorical imperative,[86] Christian

[72] ZGGM, 30.07.2022; PDLR, 17.06.2022.
[73] PSG, 11.05.2022; ZGGM, 30.07.2022.
[74] PBWK, 05.08.2022.
[75] PKLK, 16.04.2022.
[76] ZZPD, 30.06.2023; PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[77] PKLK, 16.04.2022.
[78] ZMLM, 31.10.2022.
[79] PKWK, 05.08.2022; ZGGM, 30.07.2022.
[80] PKKD, 18.06.2022.
[81] PDLR, 17.06.2022.
[82] PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[83] PKKD, 18.06.2022.
[84] ZZPD, 30.06.2023.
[85] Jaroszewicz *et. al*., 2022.
[86] PNG, 27.04.2022.

feeling,[87] and the need and "motion of the heart" to help a person in trouble.[88] Concerning the wider public attitude, the respondents first and foremost stressed the humanitarian,[89] democratic, and civic virtues[90] and cultural traditions of the Polish nation "we really love to help around here, so we treat guests very well",[91] as well as the historical experience of coexistence and interaction with the Ukrainian people[92] and cultural closeness between the Ukrainians and Poles.[93]

The respondents further noted the importance of anti-Russian sentiment in the mobilization of Polish society: "And I can't tell you... how much it is for Ukraine, and how much it is against Russia, and somehow calculate the percentages, but it seems to me that it's 50 per cent to 50 per cent"[94]; "central reason for that, the anti-Russian sentiment because, Poland was ALWAYS anti-Russian. Russia was a common enemy."[95] The historical background of relations with Russia certainly had a substantial impact on the support collectively given by the Polish people to Ukrainian refugees.

There are, of course, difficult pages in the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations as well, such as the Volyn issue. In recent years, the ruling right-wing Law and Justice Party has been placing great emphasis on the instrumentalization of the politics of history. Still, such disagreements, according to some respondents, did not play any role in the perception of the current events – on the contrary, "I think now when people stopped talking about history and moved toward the future and now, it would be easier to talk about the past, because...because the past, becomes more past."[96] According to others, the conflict has been pushed aside, "frozen for the moment,"[97] but most likely will resurface in the context of a humanitarian crisis.[98] Already today, respondents, especially those who chose to participate anonymously, are registering signs of rising social tensions on ethnic grounds, which betrays the persistence of national stereotypes[99] and of a negative attitude towards Ukrainians, albeit as a minority sentiment.[100] Some Ukrainian respondents also note cases of xenophobia.[101] However, such experiences did not affect the overall high assessment of the support and care extended to the refugees by the Polish society at large.

[87] PLL, 18.06.2022.
[88] PSL, 30.07.2023.
[89] ZJW, 23.04.2023; PSL, 30.07.2023.
[90] PLL, 18.06.2022.
[91] PGW, 24.05.2022.
[92] PNG, 27.04.2022.
[93] PSG, 11.05.2022.
[94] PGW, 24.05.2022.
[95] ZLR, 05.01.2023.
[96] PNG, 27.04.2022.
[97] ZLR, 05.01.2023.
[98] PGW, 24.05.2022.
[99] PGW, 24.05.2022; ZLR, 05.01.2023; PSL, 30.07.2023.
[100] ZJW, 23.04.2023.
[101] ZZPD, 30.06.2023; PDLR, 17.06.2022.

Both Ukrainian and Polish academics emphasized the importance of open academic discussions on controversial issues of history, but opposed their use for political purposes: "we just need to conduct the discussion in such a way as, not to give arguments to these xenophobes,"[102] or "it is possible that what divides us was somehow… provoked by some politicians, and not at all by historians."[103] They see particular danger in mixing politics with history in wartime, especially given the "high psychological level of ANXIETY among the general masses."[104]

Notable and repeatedly used metaphors for characterizing relations between the two nations were 'neighbor' and 'brother,' although some of the respondents expressed concern regarding the metaphor 'brothers and sisters,' as excessively sentimental and liable to often take the place of real action and lead to emotional fatigue: "We shouldn't be brothers and sisters, we should be, like, normal people who treat each other civilly, and that's enough for me. I don't need anything more"; "the relationship we have [...] it should be, like, FRIENDLY, it should not be familial, in my view."

At the same time, according to our Polish respondents, the tenor of the interactions between Ukrainians and Poles today, the experience of giving aid, and the "exchange of culture" between the two peoples could herald a new chapter in Polish-Ukrainian relations, "giving fantastic fruit" both at the state and community levels.[105]

For our Polish respondents, such views were based on the feeling of satisfaction bordering on surprise[106] regarding their nation's reaction to the crisis, which Polish academics usually voiced in response to the question about the significance of their experience: "I'm surprised that as a conservative anti-immigrant society we could help," or "We showed that we can act as a society."[107] Even noting the decline in public support and its growing institutionalization, the respondents still expressed hope that Polish society will remain up to the challenges it is facing.[108]

According to our Ukrainian respondents, the feeling of deep gratitude can serve as a firm foundation for the further development of Ukrainian-Polish relations:

> I... am convinced that, I really want to believe that the Ukrainians, as an equally civilized and cultured people, an incredible nation, will also remember what the Poles did for us in this war, and only together we are strong and only together we will prevail.[109]

[102] ZJW, 23.04.2023.
[103] ZRGK, 20.06.2022.
[104] PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[105] PLL, 18.06.2022; PNG, 27.04.2022.
[106] PLL, 18.06.2022; PGW, 24.05.2022.
[107] ZLR, 05.01.2023.
[108] PSL, 30.07.2023.
[109] ZMLM, 31.10.2022.

In general, Ukrainian academics, reflecting on the help they received from Polish citizens and from their colleagues in particular, unanimously stated that its extent exceeded their expectations.[110] Some Ukrainian respondents saw their interviews for the project as an act of gratitude[111] and made a point of mentioning the names of the colleagues and Polish institutions that supported them:

> if there is an opportunity somewhere, to publ- in bold, please, because these people have done in my support for my self-realization here just a tremendous job overall, well, not only mine, but several other colleagues', too. But I speak for myself, so I am extremely grateful to them and... I will remember their support for the rest of my life.[112]

## Strategies of academic migrants in Poland

Sociological studies show that the vast majority of war refugees in Poland tend to describe their situation and plans as precarious, because of the high uncertainty about developments in Ukraine.[113] The position of the Ukrainian academics, which have ample opportunities to continue their professional activities abroad thanks to grant support and at the same time to work remotely in Ukrainian research and educational institutions to which they plan to return, appears comparatively stable.

Nevertheless, the word 'uncertainty' to some extent also applies to the migration experience of Ukrainian academics, as evidenced by the results of at least one sociological survey of academic migrants. Although many respondents gave very specific answers to questions about their plans for the next several months and even in the long-term perspective (for when the hostilities end in Ukraine), the researchers also note a large number of vague answers.[114]

Uncertainty about the future largely determined the personal and professional strategies of deplaced Ukrainian academics. Most prominently, they commonly strove to continue their professional pursuits, not least in order to stabilize their emotional state in the first months of the full-scale war.[115] The possibilities included long-distance teaching at Ukrainian and Polish universities, volunteering, starting new research projects, and participating in conferences: "Well, there was no time to raise my head, and it was, probably, a good thing, because such intense work, it distracted from worrying about... our... fighters, about the events happening at the front";[116] "a person who is IN THE STATE OF WORK, or study, or work, she does feel her, being

[110] PKLK, 16.04.2022.
[111] ZMLM, 31.10.2022.
[112] ZZPD, 30.06.2023.
[113] Górny & Kaczmarczyk, 2023: 11-12.
[114] Maryl *et al*., 2022.
[115] PKLK, 16.04.2022; ZZPD, 30.06.2023.
[116] ZRGK, 20.06.2022.

NEEDED."[117] Polish academics, in their turn, speak highly of the energy of their colleagues, considering their situation and family responsibilities.[118] They mark their experience of interaction with Ukrainian colleagues as positive,[119] noting the Ukrainians' drive, optimism, and desire to return to professional activity.[120]

It is also important that many Ukrainian academics viewed the continuation of their professional activities abroad as a way to deal with their sense of guilt about leaving Ukraine,[121] which was sometimes fueled by the disapproval of this choice by their colleagues and acquaintances.[122] In this context, their work abroad took on the air of a mission. The Ukrainian scholars understood it as their task during their stay in Poland to represent their institutions and establish personal and institutional academic connections for the future.[123] Furthermore, their work could be seen as participation in the 'information front,'[124] in which it was their duty to inform the European community about the war in Ukraine[125]:

> I realized that I NEEDED to go somewhere to a safe country, and there, first, to provide for... my family... and second... to work and involve the community, in particular, the European one, in helping Ukraine, in helping the museum, to work now on the information front.[126]

Ukrainian academics reply to questions about strategies for interacting with the society around them with caution. Studies exploring migrants' strategies show that the amount of effort refugees invest in integration directly depends on the prospects of remaining in the country.[127] Seeing one's stay in Poland as temporary determined Ukrainian academics' choice of behavioral strategies that did not go beyond adaptation and can be explained using the concept of anchoring, defined as the process of searching for footholds and points of reference to attain socio-psychological stability, security, and effective functioning in a new environment.[128] In particular, this strategy

[117] PKKD, 18.06.2022.
[118] ZJW, 23.04.2023.
[119] Only one respondent spoke about a negative experience hosting a Ukrainian scholar whom had not been acquainted with previously ZLR, 05.01.2023.
[120] PLL, 18.06.2022; PGW, 24.05.2022.
[121] PKLK, 16.04.2022; ZMLM, 31.10.2022; PDLR, 17.06.2022.
[122] ZRGK, 20.06.2022; PKKD, 18.06.2022.
[123] ZRGK, 20.06.2022; ZMLM, 31.10.2022.
[124] ZMLM, 31.10.2022.
[125] ZMLM, 31.10.2022.
[126] ZRGK, 20.06.2022.
[127] Kubiciel-Lodzińska, Solga & Filipowicz, 2023: 191.
[128] Grzymała-Kazłowska & Brzozowska, 2017: 118.

includes legalizing one's position in Poland, placing children in Polish educational institutions, and learning the language in order "to say thank you properly."[129]

It is interesting to note that these behavioral strategies of Ukrainian academics were influenced less by individual prospects than by the system of family ties. Others have already argued that it is family and parental relationships that serve as anchors connecting refugees not only with their place of stay, but also with their country of origin and shaping their adaptation in the host country, or determining the decision to go back.[130] At the time of writing this article, three of our respondents had refused the prospect of continuing to work in Polish academic institutions, citing their responsibility to ensure that their children have the opportunity to see their father and grow up in a complete family.[131]

Finally, integration strategies are shaped by opportunities. Traditionally, the Polish labor market had offered Ukrainians work below their qualification level.[132] Those Ukrainian academics who have obtained jobs in Polish research and cultural institutions are fully aware of the temporary nature of the support[133] and of the need to give up their academic career/change professions if they decide to stay in Poland.[134] The Polish respondents also assessed the Ukrainians' integration into the Polish (and, more broadly, European) academic community with restraint, believing that the academic sphere in Poland is underfunded and seeing the language barrier and the ongoing crisis in the humanities as the main obstacles on this path.[135] Still, there are voices that positively evaluate the prospects of small private universities employing Ukrainian academics and generally welcome the opportunity to boost the level of internationalization of Polish research and education.[136]

Polish scholars report that the current events have sharpened the interest of Polish scholars in Ukrainian subjects and increased the relevance of research focusing on the shared historical experience of the two nations.[137] At the same time, Ukrainian studies have begun to attract more attention both from the state, in the form of government grant support, and from society in Poland.[138] This fact encourages Polish scholars working on Ukrainian subjects to be more active in the public sphere.[139]

[129] ZRGK, 20.06.2022, though Polish respondents note the progress of their Ukrainian colleagues in mastering the language after a year in Poland, ZJW, 23.04.2023.
[130] Isański & Nowak, 2023: 220.
[131] PKWK, 29.03.2023; ZZPD, 30.06.2023.
[132] Brunarska *et al.*, 2016.
[133] PBWK, 05.08.2022.
[134] PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[135] PSG, 11.05.2022; ZLR, 05.01.2023; PNG, 27.04.2022; PGW, 24.05.2022.
[136] ZLR, 05.01.2023.
[137] PSL, 30.07.2023.
[138] PNG, 27.04.2022.
[139] PNG, 27.04.2022; PSL, 30.07.2023.

Closer contacts between Polish and Ukrainian scholars became an important consequence of the forced migration of Ukrainian academics. Many of our respondents testified that these contacts were growing more 'personal'[140] and true friendships were developing.[141] One interviewee stressed that the Polish colleagues tried to create conditions in which the Ukrainian migrants could "feel at home here,"[142] and another noted: "In families, that, I consider part of my own family today and I heard every day, do not think about absolutely anything 'We are one family.'"[143]

Thus, the experience of migration made it possible to expand social and cultural connections, build friendships, and learn more about colleagues' research,[144] which are all important conditions for the development of further collaboration, potentially taking the Ukrainian and Polish academics to a new level of creative transfer of knowledge.[145] Our Polish respondents note new prospects that they associate with the expansion of cooperation with their Ukrainian colleagues and the emergence of new areas of research, but emphasize that the future of this cooperation lies at the level of interpersonal contacts between researchers interested in developing their projects.[146] In general, as sociological surveys show, Ukrainian academics view forced emigration as a real chance for deep integration into the European academic space.[147] It is precisely in establishing work contacts that the majority of Ukrainian researchers see the significance of their migration experience: "I'm also trying to establish permanent contacts, look for various kinds of conferences, in order to if anything be able, somewhere, here, let's say, to have such international connections."[148]

In general, the Ukrainian respondents showed a greater willingness to talk about the significance of their experience of emigration despite its traumatic nature. First and foremost, all respondents observed that this experience had an impact on their personal growth: "this is kind of an experience of growing up"[149] that "made me stronger,"[150] "it's such a shock that generally, in fact, COMPLETELY changes you."[151] Living through it made one reconsider one's values and priorities[152]:

[140] PKWK, 05.08.2022; PSL, 30.07.2023.
[141] ZJW, 23.04.2023; PBWK, 05.08.2022.
[142] PILK, 18.04.2022.
[143] ZMLM, 31.10.2022.
[144] For instance, one of the Polish respondents taught a mini-course for colleagues on the history of the European Union, promoting a promising research topic, ZJW, 23.04.2023.
[145] Łuczaj, Leonowicz-Bukała & Kurek-Ochmańska, 2022: 255.
[146] ZLR, 05.01.2023.
[147] Lutsenko *et al*., 2023: 43.
[148] PBWK, 05.08.2022.
[149] PBWK, 05.08.2022.
[150] ZGGM, 30.07.2022.
[151] PILK, 18.04.2022.
[152] PDLR, 17.06.2022.

> I understood even more that you should value every minute, every minute of your life, try to do everything you can to live, it NOT IN VAIN maybe to make some kind of contribution both to SCIENCE and, as a PERSON to show such, some qualities too because at any moment all this can be broken off at any moment you may lose your LOVED ONES or lose YOUR life[153]

Moreover, migration was for many the time of making difficult decisions that proved to the respondents that they were able to mobilize inner resources and face difficulties as they adapted to a new country.[154] This directly affected the gender self-perception of our female respondents: "[We] became more independent […] This is also a civic FEAT"[155]; "my experience, that I actually… was able to... Yes, that I did it."[156]

Our respondents also spoke about the great importance of professional work experience they had gained. In general, as surveys show, the vast majority of Ukrainian academics (91.9 per cent) see value in the experience of living abroad for their future professional development.[157] Our respondents particularly noted the acquisition of new pedagogical skills,[158] the "deepening of research work,"[159] getting the opportunity to organize scholarly and educational events with their international colleagues,[160] mastering the art of writing research projects competitive in the European academic space,[161] and generally receiving a push for self-improvement.[162] Interestingly, a number of respondents observed that their experience of forced migration enriched them as historians, helping them to better understand the behavior and motives of participants in the tragic historical events they study, and that it brought into sharper relief certain research angles for them.[163]

Finally, the experience of temporary migration exposed Ukrainian scholars first-hand to the cultural values of Polish society and the Polish academic community, which they consider important to share through teaching with their Ukrainian students[164] and practice in their work:

[153] ZGGM, 30.07.2022.
[154] PBWK, 05.08.2022; PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[155] PKKD, 18.06.2022.
[156] ZZPD, 30.06.2023.
[157] Maryl *et al*., 2022: 22.
[158] ZZPD, 30.06.2023.
[159] PBWK, 05.08.2022.
[160] ZMLM, 31.10.2022.
[161] PKWK, 05.08.2022.
[162] ZMLM, 31.10.2022.
[163] PILK, 18.04.2022; PKLK, 16.04.2022.
[164] PKKD, 18.06.2022.

> …this is a CERTAIN CULTURE of interaction, communication, which we in Ukraine need... to LEARN, to LEARN. Unfortunately, this is what we lack and what I would WANT as much as possible in-, through my experience and the experience of other colleagues, I hope, to… transfer to Ukraine.[165]

For many Polish respondents, the question of the meaning of their experience proved difficult. Focusing on specific stories of giving help or on discussing the new horizons opening up for European (in this case, Polish) historical scholarship, most of the respondents at this stage are not reflecting on the significance of the personal experience gained through volunteer work. Some respondents mention personal 'challenge' or encounter with the Other and talk about positive psychological effects. Nevertheless, the general mood of the interviews indicates consciousness of the value of such experiences and understanding that this 'event' will in the end become an important part of the autobiographical narrative:

> …it was just important for me not to be passive, but to be active to help, just to be, you know, in a few years to be able to think of myself as someone who was actively involved, not watching but, helping.[166]

## Conclusions

Let us note a point that seems paradoxical at first glance: despite the traumatic nature of the experience of forced migration and the continuing Russian-Ukrainian War, which significantly narrows the horizon of expectations, the general tone of most narratives recorded throughout the entire period of study demonstrates a high level of psychological capital.

The Ukrainian respondents, as expected, often talk about the range of negative emotions associated with the start of the war and the decision to leave; but at the same time they willingly reflect on the experience gained during these events, recognizing it as important ('key,' 'turning point') in the continuing creation of their lifeworld. The most valuable aspect of this experience is professional. Before 2022, none of the Ukrainian academics participating in the project had held long-term fellowships or employment abroad. Living in a foreign academic environment allowed Ukrainian scholars to develop new professional skills and also to acquire 'tacit knowledge' about the academic standards and rules of conduct within the Polish academic community. Moreover, friendly relations and collegial ties, built on the foundation of the positive emotions of gratitude on the part of the Ukrainians and a sense of fulfilled obligation

[165] ZRGK, 20.06.2022.
[166] ZLR, 05.01.2023.

on the part of the Poles, can potentially become the basis for taking academic cooperation to a new level and deepening the internationalization of research and education.

In addition, all Ukrainian academic migrants stress the personal dimension of the experience of living abroad – particularly growth in personal strength and gender self-awareness (for the female respondents). However, one of the most important aspects of their migration experience for Ukrainian intellectuals has been immersion in another culture and society at the time when it rose up to face a crisis. This close encounter has enriched them with values and emotional energy that they are eager to bring to bear on the practice of research and teaching back in Ukraine.

For Polish society in general and Polish academics in particular, aid to Ukrainian refugees became the example of a successful common undertaking that consolidated society and helped to put aside controversies and look to the future with greater hope, including in the sphere of Polish-Ukrainian relations. It is important to emphasize that such hopes are very much based on the individual memory of participants in extraordinary events, which, despite ongoing attempts to instrumentalise history, can become a form of soft power that may in the future lead to improvement in diplomatic relations and intensification of cultural and academic exchange between Ukraine and Poland.

**Bibliography**

**Sources**

All interviews are deposited at the V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University History Museum [KhNU HM]. – F. 7. – Op. 21.

PBWK, 05.08.2022
PDLR, 17.06.2022
PGW, 24.05.2022
PILK, 18.04.2022
PKKD, 18.06.2022
PKLK, 16.04.2022
PKWK, 05.08.2022
PKWK, 29.03.2023
PLL, 18.06.2022
PNG, 27.04.2022
PSG, 11.05.2022
PSL, 30.07.2023.
ZGGM, 30.07.2022
ZJW, 23.04.2023
ZKRK, 04.08.2022
ZLR, 05.01.2023
ZMLM, 31.10.2022
ZTLK, 10.06.2023
ZRGK, 20.06.2022
ZZPD, 30.06.2023.

UNHCR's Operational Date Portal (2022) Ukraine situation: Regional protection profiling and monitoring factsheet [https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/95010; access: 20.08.2023]
UNHCR's Operational Date Portal. Ukraine Refugee Situation
[https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location?secret=unhcrrestricted; access: 20.08.2023]

**Literature**


Alekseeva, T.I., Gorbanova, K.V. (2016). Intelektualna migratsia z Ukrainy [Intelectual emigration from Ukraine]. *Prichornomorski ekonomichni studii*, 11, 18–21. (in Ukrainian)

Baranik, Z.P., Romanenko, I.O. (2014). Intelektualna migratsia jak obєkt statistichnogo doslidzhennia [Migration as an object of statistical analysis]. *Efektivna ekonomika*, 6.
[http://www.economy.nayka.com.ua/?op=1&z=3096, access: 22.08.2023]. (in Ukrainian)

Baszczak, Ł., Kiełczewska, A., Kukołowicz, P., Wincewicz, A., Zyzik, R. (2022). *Pomoc polskiego społeczeństwa dla uchodźców z Ukrainy*. Warszawa: Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny.

Brunarska, Z., Kindler, M., Szulecka, M., Toruńczyk-Ruiz, S. (2016). Ukrainian Migration to Poland: A "Local" Mobility?. In O. Fedyuk, M. Kindler (Eds.), *Ukrainian Migration to the European Union. Lessons from Migration Studies* (pp. 115–132). Cham: Springer Open.

Dausien, B. (1996). *Biographie und Geschlecht: zur biographischen Konstruktion sozialer Wirklichkeit in Frauenlebensgeschichten*. Bremen: Donat.

Demidenko, O.I. (2018). Napriamki intelektualnoi migratsii gromadian Ukrainy [Directions of intellectual migration of Ukrainian citizens]. *Visnik ONU im. I. I. Mechnikova. Sotsiologia i politichni nauki*, 23, 2(31), 180–189. https://doi.org/10.18524/2304-1439.2018.2(31).144318 (in Ukrainian)

Duszczyk, M., Kaczmarczyk, P. (2022). The War in Ukraine and Migration to Poland: Outlook and Challenges. *Intereconomics*, 57(3), 164–170. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-022-1053-6

Górny, A., Kaczmarczyk, P. (2023). Between Ukraine and Poland. Ukrainian migrants in Poland during the war. *CMR Spotlight*, 2(48), 1–15.

Gorodnichenko, Y, Sologoub, I., Weder di Mauro, B. (Eds) (2022). *Rebuilding Ukraine: Principles and policies*. Paris & London: CEPR Press.

Grabowska, I., Jastrzebowska, A., Kyliushyk, I. (2023). Resilience Embedded in Psychological Capital of Ukrainian Refugees in Poland. *Migration Letters*, 20(3), 421–429. https://doi.org/10.47059/ml.v20i3.2887

Grzymała-Kazłowska, A., Brzozowska, A. (2017). From Drifting to Anchoring. Capturing the Experience of Ukrainian Migrants in Poland. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 6(2), 103–122. https://doi.org/10.17467/ceemr.2017.04

Isański, J., Michalski, M.A., Nowak, M., Sereda, V., Vakhitova, H. (2022). *Social reception and inclusion of refugees from Ukraine*. UKREF Research Report 1.

Isański, J., Nowak, M. (2023). Auto-biographies of Ukrainian war refugees. From forced migration to anchoring. *Studia Politologiczne*, 68, 209–230.

Jaroszewicz, M., Krępa, M. (2022). Stabilisation of Emergency Measures: Poland's Refugee Reception System One Month After the Russian Attack on Ukraine. In S. Carrera, M. Ineli Ciger (Eds.), *EU responses to the large-scale refugee displacement from Ukraine: an analysis on the temporary protection directive and its implications for the future EU asylum policy* (pp. 163–176). Florence: European University Institute.

Jaroszewicz, M., Krępa, M., Nowosielski, M., Pachocka, M., Wach, D. (2022). Russian aggression on Ukraine and forced migrations: the role of Poland in the first days of the crisis. *CMR Spotlight*, 3(37), 1–10.

Kubiciel-Lodzińska, S., Solga, B., Filipowicz, M. (2023). Wykwalifikowani uchodźcy z Ukrainy wyzwaniem dla rynku pracy. *Horyzonty Polityki*, 14(47), 187–207. https://doi.org/10.35765/HP.2401

Łuczaj, K., Leonowicz-Bukała, I., Kurek-Ochmańska, O. (2022). Creative class in the borderlands? The case of commuting scholars in Poland. *Creativity Studies*, 15(1), 246–262. https://doi.org/10.3846/cs.2022.12289

Lutsenko, A., Harashchenko, N., Hladchenko, L., Korytnikova, N., Moskotina, R., Pravdyva, O. (2023). The Results of the Survey on the Needs of Ukrainian Scientists. *Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper*, 23-03(1), 1–53.

Maryam, F., Astier-Ibrahim, I., Gaffey, K., Lonegard, S., Woo, Y. Y. (2023). *Transformational Humanitarian Response: The Example of Poland*. London: Humanitarian Leadership Academy.

Maryl, M., Jaroszewicz, M., Degtyarova, I., Polishchuk, Ye., Pachocka, M., Wnuk, M. (2022). *Beyond Resilience: Professional Challenges, Preferences, and Plans of Ukrainian Researchers Abroad*. Warsaw: ScienceForUkraine Survey Report.

OECD. Building back a better innovation ecosystem in Ukraine, 2022 [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/building-back-a-better-innovation-ecosystem-in-ukraine_85a624f6-en, access: 8.08.2023]

OECD. Rights and Support for Ukrainian Refugees in Receiving Countries, 2022. [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/rights-and-support-for-ukrainian-refugees-in-receiving-countries_09beb886-en, access: 10.08.2023]

OECD. The future of science in Ukraine, Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, 2022 [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/the-future-of-science-in-ukraine_afbd05df-en, access: 10.08.2023].

Sikorska I., Nykyforenko N. (2022). *Ukrainian academic refugees and humanistic international aid*. MigraREport, 1.

Vatansever, A. (2022). Blessing or curse? Third-party funding as a paradoxical pull factor in forced internationalization. In: V. Axyonova, F. Kohstall, C. Richter (Eds.), *Academics in Exile Networks, Knowledge Exchange and New Forms of Internationalization* (pp. 101–122). Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

**To cite this article**: Kiselyova, Y., Ivashchenko, V. (2024). "To live your life not in vain". Ukrainian academics' experience of forced migration in Poland. *Historia i Świat*, 13, 489–510. https://doi.org/10.34739/his.2024.13.29